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Articles 
COMMONPLACE OR ANACHRONISM: THE 
STANDARD MODEL, THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT, AND THE PROBLEM OF 
HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Saul Cornell* 
A new consensus on the meaning of the Second Amend-
ment appears to be crystallizing among constitutional scholars.1 
This new model asserts that the Second Amendment protects 
both an individual and a collective right of the people to bear 
arms. Proponents of this interpretation also argue that Amend-
ment is part of a checking function designed to enable the peo-
ple to resist government tyranny, by arms if necessary.2 Bor-
rowing conceptual language from the physical sciences, 
supporters of this new interpretation contend that scholarship on 
the Second Amendment has produced a paradigm comparable 
to that employed by physicists to describe recent research: the 
new interpretation is dubbed the "Standard Model. "3 To sup-
port their interpretation, proponents of the new orthodoxy 
quote liberally from the writings of Federalists, Anti-Federalists, 
and early constitutional commentators such as St. George 
• Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University. I would like to thank 
Steve Conrad, David Konig, Suzanna Sherry, and Eugene Volokh for reading earlier 
drafts of this essay. 
1. See Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on 
the Second Amendment, 45 Emory L.J. 1139 (1996). 
2. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassin!( Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 
(1989). 
3. On the use of the term "Standard Model" to describe the emerging body of 
scholarship on the Second Amendment, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to 
the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461-71 (1995). 
221 
222 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 16:221 
Tucker and Joseph Story, in order to support their claim that a 
broad consensus existed in post-Revolutionary America on the 
meaning of the right to bear arms.4 
The growing chorus of support for the Standard Model 
among legal scholars contrasts with the cool reaction to the 
Standard Model among early American historians.5 While legal 
scholars have confidently asserted the emergence of a new or-
thodoxy, there is little sign that historians are likely to come to a 
similar agreement. Indeed, the dominant trends in recent histo-
riography point in the opposite direction. The notion that 
American political thought might be understood in terms of a 
single ideological paradigm has collapsed under the accumulat-
ing weight of evidence demonstrating the incredible vitality and 
diversity of American political culture in the Revolutionary era.6 
Ironically, at precisely the moment that many historians have 
abandoned the search for a "unified field theory" that can ac-
commodate the heterogeneity of American political culture, le-
gal scholars have turned to the language of physics and pro-
claimed the existence of a Standard Model.7 Rather than begin 
4. See, e.g., Levinson, 99 Yale L.J. (cited in note 2); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 
Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991); Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Van-
ishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 831 (1998). 
5. For explicit historical critiques of the Standard Model, see Michael A. Belle-
siles, Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 
L. & Hist. Rev. 567 (1998), and Gary Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. Rev. of Books 
62 (Sept. 21, 1995). For a response to Wills, see Letters by Sanford Levinson, David C. 
Williams, and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, N.Y. Rev. of Books 61 (Nov. 16, 1995). The ef-
forts of Standard Modelers to overturn the traditional states' rights argument has blinded 
legal scholars to the centrality of federalism to the debate over the Bill of Rights. For a 
useful corrective to this view, see Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A 
Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 Wm. & Mary Q. 39 (1998). 
For dissent within the legal academy see Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitu-
tional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 57 
(1995), and Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 Valp. U. 
L. Rev. 107 (1991). For an example of historical scholarship supportive of the individual 
rights position central to the Standard Model, see Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological 
Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. of Am. Hist. 599 (1982); for a counter-argument 
that the amendment reflected a collective right rooted in civic republican ideals, see Law-
rence Delbert Cross, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to 
Bear Arms, 71 J. of Am. Hist. 22 (1984); see also The Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 
71 J. of Am. Hist. 587 (exchange between Shalhope and Cross). 
6. The most recent study of ratification supports the notion that neither Federalist 
nor Anti-Federalist ideas can be fit into a single explanatory model. Michael Gillespie 
and Michael Lienesch, eds., Ratifying the Constitution (U. Press of Kansas, 1989). For 
another useful effort to chart the range of discourses available to Americans during the 
struggle over the Constitution, see Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": 
The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (1988). 
7. It is also ironic that the Standard Model in physics is itself being transformed, as 
competing versions of string theory have been propounded in an effort to move closer to 
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with the assumption of a broad consensus, historical scholarship 
has increasingly embraced a pluralist model of early American 
political and constitutional thought.8 
The flaws in the Standard Model are emblematic of deeper 
problems in the way history has been used by constitutional 
scholars.9 Partisans of the Standard Model have not only read 
constitutional texts in an anachronistic fashion, but have also ig-
nored important historical sources vital to understanding what 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists might have meant by the right 
to bear arms. The structure of legal scholarship has served to 
spread these errors rather than to contain them. Once pub-
lished, these errors enter the canons of legal scholarship and are 
continuously recycled in article after article.10 Upon closer in-
spection, the new orthodoxy on the Second Amendment shares 
little with the Standard Model employed by physicists. Indeed, 
recent writing on the Second Amendment more closely resem-
bles the intellectual equivalent of a check kiting scheme than it 
does solidly researched history. 
The problem with the legal scholarship associated with the 
Standard Model is not simply a function of failing to remain up-
to-date with the latest trends in early American historiography. 
Standard Modelers have more fundamentally failed to heed the 
useful guidelines suggested by H. Jefferson Powell in his impor-
tant essay, "Rules for Originalists."11 In that article, Powell cor-
rectly warned legal scholars about the dangers of anachronism in 
constitutional scholarship. The first error is to assume that the 
a more complete account of the universe. See George Johnson, Almost in Awe, Physi-
cists Ponder Ultimate Theory, N.Y. Times D8 (Sept. 22,1998). 
8. The last effort to formulate such a unified field theory was Robert E. Shalhope, 
Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in 
American Historiography, 29 Wm. & Mary Q. 49 (1972). In his more recent work, Shal-
hope has embraced a more pluralist conception of early American political culture. See 
Robert E. Shalhope, Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800 
(Twayne, 1990). For a post-mortem on republican synthesis, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Re-
publicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. of Am. Hist. 11 (1992). Among historians, 
pluralism now seems to be the ascendent paradigm for understanding the ideologies of 
the Founding era. 
9. See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal 
Scholarship, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 87 (1997). 
10. Thus, Akhil Amar cites Sanford Levinson, and David Williams cites Akhil 
Amar, and Glen Harlan Reynolds cites Levinson, Amar, and Williams. None of these 
articles has been subjected to the sorts of blind peer review that scholarship published in 
journals such as the William and Mary Quanerly, Journal of American History or the 
Law and History Review must pass before publication. Once historical errors enter this 
closed system, they are endlessly reproduced. 
11. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalisrs, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659 (1987). 
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framers shared our world view: "The 1787 Constitution and the 
first twelve amendments," Powell noted, "were written and rati-
fied by people whose intellectual universe was distant from ours 
in deeply significant ways." 12 The second error, also identified by 
Powell and committed by the Standard Modelers, is to forget 
that "[c]onsensus or even broad agreement among the founders 
is a historical assertion to be justified, not assumed. "13 When 
Standard Modelers claim that they have produced voluminous 
evidence to demonstrate such a consensus, they fall into an even 
more deeply rooted historical fallacy: rather than demonstrate 
the existence of a broad cultural agreement, supporters of the 
Standard Model have assumed that a common set of terms im-
plied a deeper consensus on what those terms meant. 
This anachronism at the heart of the growing body of litera-
ture on the Standard Model has been brought into sharper focus 
by Eugene Volokh's important essay, "The Commonplace Sec-
ond Amendment. "14 Volokh produces copious evidence to sug-
gest that similar language was found in nearly all of the constitu-
tional documents produced in post-Revolutionary America, 
most notably the many state constitutions drafted during this pe-
riod. Volokh suggests that the inclusion of provisions securing 
the right to bear arms in state constitutions demonstrates that 
"these provisions secure rights against the state governments. "15 
If this is true, he argues, "they must recognize a right belonging 
to someone other than the state. "16 For Volokh this discovery 
provides further proof that the right to bear arms must have 
been viewed as an individual right by Americans of the Revolu-
tionary generation. 
Volokh is not alone. Other supporters of the Standard 
Model have also marshalled compelling evidence that Ameri-
cans in this period shared a common constitutional language. 
But documenting the recurring use of a particular set of terms is 
not the same as understanding how Americans used the lan-
guage of constitutionalism. Part of the problem with the Stan-
dard Model stems from a failure to grapple with a basic problem 
of historical interpretation, identified by the Cambridge histo-
rian Quentin Skinner in one of the most influential historical es-
12. ld. at 673. 
13. ld. at 684 
14. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793 
(1998). 
15. ld. at 810. 
16. ld. 
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says written in the last fifty years, "Meaning and Understanding 
in the History of Ideas."17 In that essay, Skinner makes a vital 
distinction between "the occurrence of the words (phrases or 
sentences) which denote the given idea, and the use of the rele-
vant sentence by a particular agent on a particular occasion with 
a particular intention (his intention) to make a particular state-
ment."18 The approach of Standard Modelers does not tell us 
much about the intent of the authors who wrote these texts. 
What did Federalists and Anti-Federalists each mean by the 
right to bear arms? The Standard Model suffers from the prob-
lem that mars so much law office history: a failure to adequately 
contextualize constitutional texts. To understand what a par-
ticular historical actor meant when he wrote about the right to 
bear arms requires scholars to immerse themselves in the sur-
viving evidence from this period and to analyze published and 
unpublished sources, private comments as well as public state-
ments. Indeed, in addition to the plethora of traditional textual 
sources, one must explore the political and social texts from this 
period. The behavior of the historical actors who wrote these 
texts must be read alongside their published statements.19 
This failure of the Standard Model to place language in con-
text is encapsulated in the notion of the "commonplace" that 
Volokh invokes in his recent essay. Standard Modelers have 
treated the recurring use of particular constitutional terms as ex-
amples of commonplaces.20 What this approach ignores is the 
profound difference between our modem notion of the com-
monplace and the way in which the eighteenth century under-
17. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in James 
Tully, ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics 29-67 (Princeton U. 
Press, 1988). For a thoughtful discussion of the implications of Skinner's essay for consti-
tutional theory, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 
in Jack N. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate Over Original Intent 
227-62 (1990). 
18. Skinner, Meaning and Urukrstanding at 55 (cited in note 17). 
19. On the absence historical contextualization in constitutional theory, see Martin 
S. Flaherty, History "Lile" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 
(1995). On the need to consult non-traditional texts, including social texts such as crowd 
behavior, to recover lost constitutional voices, see Saul Cornell, Moving Beyond the 
Canon of Traditional Constitutional History: Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights, and the 
Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 12 L. and Hist. Rev. 1 (1994). 
20. Volokh, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 810 (cited in note 14). Volokh's reading of the 
Second Amendment has been challenged by David Williams, who stresses the republican 
character of the Second Amendment. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the 
Cilizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551 (1991), and David 
C. Williams, Response: The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 822 (1988). 
The problem with this critique is that it also assumes a consensus in post-Revolutionary 
political and constitutional thought. 
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stood this term. The notion of the commonplace itself needs to 
be understood historically. 
Educated Americans of the Revolutionary generation often 
kept commonplace books in which they copied passages from 
important texts. As literary historian Jay Fliegelman notes, the 
writers of commonplace books invariably edited and improved 
the texts they selected, in essence interpreting and re-reading the 
texts they copied. The ideas in commonplace books, upon closer 
inspection, were anything but commonplace. The practice of 
transcribing passages into commonplace books, like the drafting 
of constitutions, was not a passive exercise of simply repeating 
tired political cliches but rather a dynamic process in which indi-
viduals often transformed the meaning of the texts they read in 
profound ways.21 
The contentiousness of American political and constitu-
tional thought was evident to John Adams, who lamented the 
confusion in post-Revolutionary political discourse. Americans, 
Adams observed, could not even agree on the meaning of so ba-
sic a term as republicanism. He cautioned one correspondent 
that "[f]raud lurks in generals."22 Exasperated by a tendency for 
political language to become debased, Adams complained that 
"[t]here is not a more unintelligible word in the English language 
than republicanism. "23 Most historians now accept the accuracy 
of Adams's observation and have recognized that republican, 
liberal, and religious idioms were mixed together in a bewilder-
ing range of combinations during the late eighteenth century.24 
21. On the culture of commonplace books, see Jay Fliegelman, Declaring Inde-
pendence: Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture of PerformiJIIce (Stanford U. 
Press, 1993). See also Douglas L. Wilson, Thomas Jefferson's Early Notebooks, 42 Wm. 
& Mary Q. 433 (1985); David Konig, Legal Fictions and the Rule(s) of Law: The Jefferso-
nians Critique of Common Law Adjudication, in Bruce H. Mann and Christopher L. 
Tomlins, eds., The Many Legalities of Early America (1999). On the notion of readers as 
active producers of meaning, see Kathy Davidson, Revolution and the Word: The Rise of 
the Novel in America (Oxford U. Press,1986). 
22. Linda Kerber, The Republican Ideology of the Revolutionary Generation, 37 
Am. Q. 474, 474 (1985) (quoting John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, August, 8, 1807). 
Kerber's essay stresses both the variety of different discourses available to Americans 
during the Revolutionary generation and the ability of republicanism to be re-shaped by 
different groups to suit their particular political aspirations. Additional evidence of Ad-
ams's frustration with the absence of consensus in America on the meaning of basic con-
cepts such as republicanism may be found in his monumental study, A Defense of the 
Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (C. Dilly, 1787). 
23. Kerber, 37 Am. Q. at 474 (quoting Adams to Warren) (cited in note 22). 
24. For an excellent model of how different idioms could be fused together in novel 
ways, see James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, 
and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 14 J. of Am. Hist. 9 (1987). 
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A systematic survey of the full range of American ideas 
about rights in the Revolutionary era examining the broad range 
of relevant sources would be a monumental undertaking. Yet 
such an exhaustive inquiry is not necessary to raise profound 
questions about the accuracy of the Standard Model. Consider 
the case of Pennsylvania, one of the many constitutional exam-
ples cited by supporters of the Standard Model.25 In one of the 
most even-handed discussions of the Second Amendment, David 
T. Hardy concludes that Pennsylvanians "sought an unques-
tionably individual right. "26 Pennsylvania is thus a crucial test 
case for the Standard Model. In addition to the fact that the 
Standard Modelers rely on it, there are other reasons why Penn-
sylvania provides an excellent venue to contextualize the debate 
over the meaning of the Second Amendment. Ratification in this 
key state produced one of the most lively public debates over the 
meaning of the Constitution, and the writings of Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists in Pennsylvania were among the most influen-
tial and widely distributed of any essays published during ratifi-
cation.27 
How did Pennsylvanians understand the right to bear arms? 
Rather than demonstrate consensus, the historical evidence sug-
gests that there was considerable conflict over how to under-
stand this right.28 Indeed, one need not even look beyond the 
ranks of Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists to see the contested na-
ture of this seemingly commonplace idea. When the views of 
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists are examined in historical con-
25. Reynolds, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. (cited in note 3). For other examples of scholarship 
that has relied on Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist thought, see Thomas B. McAffee and 
Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, His-
tory, or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 781 (1997); Nelson Lund, The Past 
and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 Ga. L. Rev. I (1996); Stephen P. Hal-
brook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, 
and the Second Amendment, 26 Valp. U. L. Rev. 131 (1991). 
26. David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of 
Rights, 4 J.L. & Politics 1, 39 (1987). 
27. On the distribution of these items and other writings by Pennsylvania Federal-
ists and Anti-Federalists, see Merrill Jensen, ed., 13 The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution, 588-96 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976) 
("DHRC'). 
28. For useful discussions of the different approaches of Federalists and Anti-
Federalists to the problem of rights, see Paul Finkleman, Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Anarchy, Tyranny, and the Debate over a Bill of Rights, in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. 
Albert, eds., The Bill of Rights: Government Proscribed 103-74 (U. Press of Virginia, 
1997); on the diversity with the ranks of Anti-Federalists, see Saul Cornell, Mere Parch-
ment Barriers? Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights, and the Question of Rights Conscious-
ness, in Hoffman and Albert, eds., The Bill of Rights at 175-208. 
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text, they raise serious doubts about the historical validity of the 
Standard Model. 
RETHINKING THE MEANING OF LIBERTY AND 
RIGHTS: THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776 
The language of the Pennsylvania state constitution of 1 n6 
is often cited in support of the Standard Model's claim that the 
right to bear arms was an individual right that protected citizens 
from their state governments. The relevant provision in the 1776 
Pennsylvania provision asserts: 
The people have a right to bear arms for the defense of them-
selves and the State; and as standing armies in time of peace 
are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up. And 
the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and 
governed by the civil power. 29 
Shortly after adopting this language into their constitution, 
Pennsylvanians enacted a stringent loyalty oath. The Test Acts, 
as they were known to contemporaries, barred citizens who re-
fused to take the oath from voting, holding public office, serving 
on juries, and transferring real estate. Individuals who refused 
the oath could also be disarmed, as "persons disaffected to the 
liberty and independence of this state."30 The Acts thus stripped 
many essential rights from a large segment of the population, 
perhaps as much as forty percent of the citizenry. Both the tim-
ing and language of the Acts suggests that they were not simply 
an emergency measure enacted during time of war, but a reflec-
tion of a particular republican ethos that was antithetical to 
modern liberal ideas about rights. As historian Douglas Arnold 
notes, "the avowed policy of the architects of the test acts was, 
thus, not simply to provide for internal security but to reduce the 
political community to the 'faithful. "'31 Efforts to challenge the 
29. Pennsylvania Convention, Declaration of Rights, August 21, 1TI6, in Jack N. 
Rakove, ed., Declaring Rights: A Brief History With Documents 86-81 (Bedford Books, 
1998). 
30. The Test Act was passed 17TI. See James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders, eds., 
9 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 110-14 (Wm. Stanley Ray, 1903). The act was 
amended and the provisions for disarming "persons disaffected to the liberty and inde-
pendence of this state" strengthened in 1778. Id. at 346-48. 
31. Douglas Arnold, A Republican Revolution: Ideology and Politics in Pennsylva-
nia, 1776-1790 at 109 (Garland Publishing, 1989). Another useful account of the contro-
versy over the Acts may be found in Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in 
Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 at 282 (Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 
1942). 
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constitutionality of the acts were unsuccessful and they remained 
in effect until abolished by the legislature in 1789. Throughout 
this period Pennsylvania's Constitutionalists, the group who 
would become the leading Anti-Federalists in the state, de-
fended the Acts. 
The evidence of the Test Acts shows that, contrary to the 
claims of legal scholars such as Sanford Levinson and David 
Williams, there is nothing embarrassing or terrifying about the 
way Pennsylvanians understood the right to bear arms. Gun 
ownership in Pennsylvania was based on the idea that one 
agreed to support the state and to defend it against those who 
might use arms against it. Only citizens who were willing to 
swear an oath to the state could claim the right to bear arms. 
Gun ownership in Pennsylvania was thus predicated on a rejec-
tion of the very right of armed resistance posited by the Stan-
dard Model.32 The failure to consider the Test Acts, arguably the 
most important pieces of legislation enacted by Pennsylvania af-
ter adoption of their Constitution, is a serious historical omission 
on the part of supporters of the Standard Model.33 
A number of supporters of the Standard Model have also 
drawn an analogy between the structural roles played by the 
press and by an armed population in checking government tyr-
anny. While this comparison is instructive, it rests on an histori-
cally questionable reading of the way the press functioned in 
post-revolutionary America.34 While leading Pennsylvania Con-
32. For an argument that a similar policy informed gun laws in other states, see 
Bellesiles, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. (cited in note 5). 
33. See, e.g., Levinson, 99 Yale LJ. (cited in note 2); Williams, 101 Yale L.J. (cited 
in note 20). Even in his extremely balanced account, David Hardy does not consider the 
Test Acts, an omission that calls into question his individualist reading of Pennsylvanian 
views of the right to bear arms. Hardy, 4 J.L. and Pol. 39 (cited in note 26). Stephen P. 
Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 Vt. L. Rev. 255 (1985) provides a cursory 
treatment of the Acts that both misconstrues the intent and scope of the Acts. Neither 
Halbrook nor Hardy consults Brunhouse or Arnold's work. The latter's 1976 Princeton 
University doctoral dissertation, originally titled Political Ideology and the Internal 
RevolUJion in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790, provides a detailed discussion of the controversy 
over the Test Acts. 
34. On the connections between the First and Second Amendment and the notion 
of a checking function, see L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1311 (1997). Powe's ideas have been endorsed by J.M. 
Balkin and Sanford Levinson in The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
963-1013 n.157 (1998). Both of these discussions of free speech rest on outdated histori-
ography tied to the controversy around the work of Leonard Levy. On this debate, see 
Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (Oxford U. Press, 1985). For a critique of 
Levy's thesis, see David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Free-
dom of Expression in Early American History, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 795 (1985). The terms of 
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stitutionalists certainly believed in freedom of the press, these 
same individuals also accepted the notion of seditious libel. 
Support for these two seemingly contradictory propositions did 
not mean that Constitutionalists were hypocrites. The appropri-
ate means to both guard liberty and restrain licentiousness was 
to have the jury empowered to determine both the facts and the 
law on questions of libel. The conception of liberty that Consti-
tutionalists embraced looked to the jury to protect liberty and to 
enforce communal norms. Because of this conception of liberty, 
Pennsylvania's constitution granted enormous latitude to the 
legislature to enact laws to promote the public good. Thus, for 
example, the authors of the Pennsylvania constitution showed no 
reservations about passing legislation banning the theater in 
Philadelphia as a threat to public virtue. Such a measure was 
perfectly compatible with constitutional ideas behind the Test 
Acts. Closing the theater or excluding large numbers of the 
population from claiming a right to gun ownership sprang from 
the same republican conception of liberty. 35 Once again, the no-
tion that the Pennsylvania state constitution protected a modem 
liberal rights based vision of constitutionalism is simply anachro-
nistic. 
Proponents of the Standard Model concede that the repub-
lican emphasis on virtue justified the exclusion of a small cate-
gory of citizens from gun ownership. Thus Glenn Harlan Rey-
nolds echoes the claim of gun rights advocate Don Kates that 
"this emphasis on the virtuous citizen does not preclude laws 
disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) or those who, like chil-
dren or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed incapable of vir-
tue. "36 This generalization clearly needs to be re-examined. 
Pennsylvania Constitutionalists, the supporters of the state con-
this debate have shifted considerably since the publication of Levy's work. A more his-
torically persuasive effort to root ideas about seditious libel in the context of post-
revolutionary constitutionalism may be found in Norman Rosenberg, Protecting the Best 
Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel (U. of North Carolina Press, 1986). Ro-
senberg's work provides a useful corrective to the Levy thesis and its critics. 
35. It is worth observing that on a variety of other constitutional questions, includ-
ing issues of political economy and representation, Anti-Federalists did articulate a more 
liberal constitutional vision. For a good illustration of the liberal dimensions of Pennsyl-
vania Anti-Federalism, see Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Mak-
ing of the Constitution, in Richard Beeman, et al., eds., Beyond Confederation: Origins of 
the Constitution and American National Identity (U. of North Carolina Press, 1987). On 
the blending of liberal and republican elements in Anti-Federalist thought, see Saul Cor-
nell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-
1828 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
36. Reynolds, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. at 480 (cited in note 3) (quoting Don B. Kates Jr., 
The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 143, 146 (1986)). 
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stitution of 1776, believed that a much wider group of citizens 
could be excluded from the right to bear arms. 
PENNSYLVANIA ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 was written by the 
men who would eventually become the most prominent Anti-
Federalists in that state. The most detailed elaboration of Penn-
sylvania Anti-Federalist ideas about the nature of constitutions 
and rights was framed by the Anti-Federalist author who 
adopted the republican pen-name of "An Old Whig."37 In con-
trast to supporters of the new Federal Constitution, this Anti-
Federalist made it clear that he put his faith in traditional "old 
whig" principles rather than in the innovations proposed by 
Federalists. In An Old Whig's constitutional thought, the rights 
of the community to legislate on behalf of the public good were 
not antithetical to liberty: 
If [the people] yield up all their natural rights they are abso-
lute slaves to their governors. If they yield up less than is 
necessary, the government is so feeble, that it cannot protect 
them.-To yield up so much, as is necessary for the purposes 
of government; and to retain all beyond what is necessary, is 
h . 38 t e great pomt. 
Certain rights could never be ceded by individuals. Religious 
conscience was the most obvious example of a right which could 
not be renounced. Other rights could only be compromised 
when the good of society demanded such sacrifices. Individual 
liberty could never be sacrificed for the good of a particular in-
terest, or faction. Limits on liberty were permissible as long as 
laws were enacted by representatives of the people. It was vital, 
however, for citizens to remain active, vigilant, and even suspi-
cious of government, so that representatives would never lose 
sight of the public good. This attitude did not mean that Anti-
Federalists were anti-statist. 39 Anti-Federalists placed tremen-
37. In his collection of Anti-Federalist writings, Herbert J. Storing does not identify 
the authorship of An Old Whig, but evidence for this attribution may be found in a letter 
from William Shippen, Jr., to Thomas Lee Shippen, (Nov. 18 and 22, 1787), in 2 DHRC 
at 288 (cited in note 27). These essays were most likely a collective effort of a number of 
the most prominent members of Pennsylvania's Constitutionalist party. An Old Whig, 
Essays of An Old Whig, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 3 The Complete Anti-Federalist 17 (U. 
of Chicago Press, 1981 ). 
38. ld. at 33. 
39. The notion that American political thought was strongly anti-statist is central to 
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dous faith in the ability of the state to legislate on behalf of the 
public good. It was precisely because the state government 
could be counted on to represent the will of the people that An 
Old Whig advised his readers that, "[i)f, indeed, government 
were really strengthened by such surrender" of rights, and "if the 
body of the people were made more secure, or more happy by 
the means, we ought to make the sacrifice. "40 He reiterated this 
by declaring that "if the good of his country should require it; 
and every individual in the community ought to strip himself of 
some convenience for the sake of the public good. "41 Republican 
notions of citizenship, of sacrificing some measure of one's lib-
erty to serve the public good, were deemed essential.42 
"[W)herever the subject is convinced that nothing more is re-
quired from him, than what is necessary for the good of the 
community, he yields a cheerful obedience, which is more useful 
than the constrained service of slaves."43 An Old Whig willingly 
sacrificed a considerable degree of liberty, including the rights of 
dissenting religious and political minorities who were effectively 
disenfranchised and disarmed by state loyalty oaths, when the 
good of the community demanded such concessions. 
An Old Whig provided one of the most thoughtful state-
ments of Pennsylvanian Anti-Federalist constitutional ideals. A 
more widely distributed and in many respects more influential 
articulation of those views was provided by "The Dissent of the 
Minority," written shortly after Pennsylvania's ratification of the 
federal Constitution.44 Although assembled in some haste, the 
the argument of Levinson, 99 Yale L.J. (cited in note 2). A similar notion also informs 
the argument of McAffee and Quinlan, 75 N.C. L. Rev. (cited in note 25). Both of these 
arguments also rest on a selective reading of the evidence. Most Anti-Federalists clearly 
placed great faith in their state governments. A more balanced assessment of Anti-
Federalist views about the relationship between liberty and the state may be found in 
Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Pro11isions, 1776-1791, in William E. Nelson 
and Robert Palmer, eds., Libeny and Community: Constitution and Rights in the Early 
American Republic (Oceana Publications, 1987). 
40. An Old Whig, Essays at49 (cited in note 37). 
41. ld. 
42. Perhaps the best effort to demonstrate how Whig constitutional thought recon-
ciled liberty with republican ideals may be found in John Phillip Reid, Constitutional 
History of the American Re11olution: The Authority of Rights (U. of Wisconsin Press, 
1986), and The Concept of Libeny in the Age of the American Re11olution (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1988). 
43. An Old Whig, Essays at 33 (cited in note 37). 
44. John Smilie, an author of the Old Whig essays, was one of the signers of the 
Dissent. Although the Dissent was signed by the Anti-Federalist members of the state 
ratification convention, including Smilie, it was drafted by Samuel Bryan, one of the most 
important Anti-Federalist essayists. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minor-
ity ... , in 2 DHRC at 617-24 (cited in note 27). Gary Wills notes that this piece was com-
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views expressed in the Dissent attained a semi-official status as 
the statement of the Anti-Federalist minority of Pennsylvania's 
ratification convention. The Dissent not only provided a concise 
statement of Anti-Federalist objections to the Constitution, but 
also offered one of the first proposals for amendments to the 
Constitution, including two provisions on the right to bear arms. 
The two amendments suggested by the Dissent of the Mi-
nority that touched on the right to bear arms need to be read 
against the general principles defined by An Old Whig. The 
Dissent of the Minority recommended the following amend-
ments to the Constitution: 
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of 
themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for 
the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for 
disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes com-
mitted, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as 
standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, 
they ought not to be kept up; and that the military shall be 
kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the 
civil powers .... 
The inhabitants of the several states shall have the liberty to 
fowl and hunt in seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and 
on all other lands in the United States not enclosed, and in 
like manner to fish in all navigable waters, and others not pri-
vate property, without being restrained therein bJ any laws to 
be passed by the legislature of the United States. 
The key phrase in the first provision of the Dissent, which is 
generally overlooked, is the clause that allows individuals who 
pose a danger to the public to be disarmed. Anti-Federalists 
clearly read this clause in extremely broad terms. The second 
posed in a hurry and is not among the most intellectually powerful representations of 
Anti-Federalist thought. See Wills, N.Y. Rev. of Books at 65 (cited in note 5). While 
these characterizations may be apt, it is also important to recognize that despite these 
shortcomings, the Dissent became one of the most widely reprinted Anti-Federalist es-
says. 
In treating Anti-Federalist thought it is important to draw a distinction between 
those essays that were influential in 1787-88 and those that have become central to the 
modem scholarly canon. In a number of cases the texts most esteemed by modem com-
mentators were not necessarily the ones most important to Anti-Federalists during ratifi-
cation. For more on this issue, see Cornell, The Other Founders at 25-26 (cited in note 
35). 
45. Dissent of the Minority at 623-24 (cited in note 44). The provisions about hunt-
ing and fowling were not emulated by any state ratification conventions when proposals 
for amendments were debated. 
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provision, it is worth noting, bars Congress but not the states 
from placing restrictions on hunting. Rather than revealing an 
expansive individual right to bear arms, the Dissent reflects the 
strong states' rights conception of liberty defended by Pennsyl-
vania Anti-Federalists. While Anti-Federalists in this state may 
have feared a distant government, they placed enormous faith in 
their state government. 
Only by understanding the nature of Pennsylvania Anti-
Federalism can the claim of John Smilie in the Pennsylvania rati-
fying Convention be properly contextualized. Smilie argued that 
"[w]hen a select militia is formed; the people in general may be 
disarmed." 46 What did Smilie mean? If lifted out of context, 
Smilie's words would seem to provide strong proof of the claims 
of Standard Modelers. Yet, Smilie, one of the authors of An Old 
Whig and a strong supporter of his state's Test Acts, clearly ac-
cepted that serious restraints could be placed on the right to bear 
arms without undermining the idea of a liberty. Although he 
feared that federal control of the militia might disarm citizens, 
he showed no similar concern about his own state government -
which had done precisely that with its Test Act. Smilie shared 
with many Anti-Federalists considerable faith in the ability of 
state government to regulate gun ownership. The state would 
decide who among the people demonstrated sufficient virtue to 
be trusted with the important task of serving in the militia. 
The question of who exactly were "the people" was not only 
central to the meaning of the Second Amendment, but was also 
at the heart of the debate between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists during ratification. The key question for Americans 
after 1776 was how the voice of the people was to be discerned. 
Indeed, the argument between Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
turned on this vital issue. For Anti-Federalists, appeals to the 
people that bypassed the existing structures of government, par-
ticularly the states, were viewed as a rhetorical ploy. The 
American people did not exist as an abstraction. The will of the 
people could only be organized though corporate entities such as 
towns and states.47 The effort to counterpose states' rights and 
46. Speech from John Smilie to the Pennsylvania State Convention (Dec. 6, 1787), 
in 2 DHRC at 509 (cited in note 27). For a discussion of the controversy over the crea-
tion of a select militia, see Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of 
an Anglo-American Right 156 (Harvard U. Press, 1995). Malcolm quotes Smilie's con-
vention speech without placing his statement in the context of Smilie's earlier involve-
ment with the Test Act controversy. 
47. On the idea of the people as a political fiction, see EdmundS. Morgan, Invent-
1999] COMMONPLACE OR ANACHRONISM 235 
individual rights is one of the most serious anachronisms in re-
cent discussions of Anti-Federalism by supporters of the Stan-
dard Model. 
Deciding exactly who the people were was closely con-
nected to the problem of social class. Indeed, the meaning of the 
right to bear arms, unlike virtually any other right described in 
either state constitutions or the federal Constitution, was colored 
by the inchoate notions of class and rank that shaped American 
politics in this period 48 Standard Modelers have generally ap-
proached Anti-Federalists as though they were modern demo-
crats.49 This misreading of the evidence has colored the way con-
cepts such as the ideal of a general militia have been interpreted. 
The claim that such a militia included the full body of citizens 
needs to be carefully scrutinized. One of the most contentious 
issues pertaining to the militia was efforts by the wealthy to 
avoid militia service by hiring substitutes.50 In effect, one could 
buy an exemption from a basic constitutional obligation. At the 
other extreme there was also concern over the threat posed by 
the inclusion of unpropertied citizens within the ranks of the mi-
litia.51 The tendency to homogenize the thought of Anti-
ing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America 263-87 (Norton, 
1988). The connections between states' rights and individual rights in Anti-Federalist 
thought are discussed in Cornell, Mere Parchment Barriers (cited in note 28). 
48. For rather different approaches to the problem of class and rank in this period, 
see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (A.A. Knopf, 1992), 
and Alfred F. Young, ed., Beyond the American Revolution: Explorations in the History 
of American Radicalism (Northern Illinois U. Press, 1993). The issue of race is even 
more complex than class. For an argument that race was not an obstacle to gun owner-
ship, see Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward 
an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Georgetown L.J. 309 (1991). For an interpreta-
tion that stresses the exclusion of African-Americans, see Bellesiles, 16 L. and Hist. Rev. 
(cited in note 5). 
49. The claim that Anti-Federalism was essentially democratic is central to both 
Amar, 100 Yale L.J. (cited in note 4), and Williams, 101 Yale L.J. (cited in note 20). The 
problem with this view is that it ignores the complexity and diversity of Anti-Federalism, 
which included a broad spectrum of political views, some quite democratic and others 
extremely elitist. 
50. Mark Pitcavage, An Equitable Burden: The Decline of State Militias, 1783-1858 
(1995) (Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University). 
51. A number of Anti-Federalists expressed concern over the danger posed by the 
propertyless, who lacked the virtue associated with a militia composed of yeoman farm-
ers or planters. These Anti-Federalists feared that the rabble might become an instru-
ment of despotism. One forceful expression of this fear occurred in the Virginia Conven-
tion. See George Mason, Speech in the Virginia Ratification Convention Debates, in 10 
DHRC at 1312 (cited in note 27). Mason believed that state control of the militia pro-
vided a solution to this problem by ensuring that virtuous members of the gentry retained 
positions of authority in the militia. Mason's thought reflected the hierarchical assump-
tions of planter society. On this point see Morgan, Inventing the People at 173 (cited in 
note 47). Recent historical scholarship suggests that even in Virginia the politics of def-
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Federalists, casting the opposition to the Constitution as an es-
sentially populist democratic movement, ignores the thought of 
elite Anti-Federalism and confuses the profound differences 
separating moderate democrats from the most radical wing of 
the Anti-Federalist coalition. 52 
Consider the case of two authors often quoted by Standard 
Modelers, New York's Federal Farmer and Virginia's George 
Mason. Ironically, the more hierarchical nature of Virginia soci-
ety facilitated a more inclusive view of who might serve in the 
militia. Virginians such as Mason might confidently count on a 
political culture shaped by the ideal of deference to contain the 
threat posed by class antagonisms. New York's Federal Farmer 
was far less sanguine about the inclusion of the propertyless 
within the ranks of the militia.53 While Standard Modelers have 
often cited Federal Farmer, they have seldom correctly identi-
fied its author.54 Federal Farmer expressed the views of New 
York's Clintonians and may well have been the merchant Mel-
ancton Smith. Federal Farmer's variant of democracy captured 
the emerging liberal economic ideals of the merchant community 
in New York. Rather than praise the populism of Daniel Shays, 
Federal Farmer denounced Shays's Rebellion as an example of 
erence was breaking down. For a discussion of how members of the Virginia gentry dealt 
with the threat posed by an armed population, see Michael A. McDonnell, Popular Mo-
bilization and Political Culture in Revolutionary Virginia: The Failure of the Minutemen 
and the Revolution from Below, 85 J. of Am. History 946,948 (1998). 
52. Cornell, The Other Founders (cited in note 35). 
53. New York's Federal Farmer also argued that state control of the militia was 
necessary to prevent the creation of a select militia composed of the propertyless. In 
contrast to Mason, Federal Farmer viewed the propertyless as a much greater threat to 
social stability. Federal Farmer, Leners from the Federal Farmer, in Storing, 2 Complete 
Ami-Federalist at 341-42 (cited in note 37). 
54. The identity of the Federal Farmer has been a subject of considerable contro-
versy. Once thought to be the work of Virginian Richard Henry Lee, the case against Lee 
is forcefully argued by Gordon S. Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from the Federal 
Farmer, 31 Wm. & Mary Q. 299 (1974). Wood's suggestion that Federal Farmer was 
probably a New Yorker has been elaborated by Robert H. Webking who argues that 
Federal Farmer may have been the New York merchant Melancton Smith. Robert H. 
Webking, Melancton Smith and the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. 
510 (1987). For examples of legal scholars who have used an older mistaken attribution 
of Federal Farmer's identity, see David T. Hardy, 4 J.L. & Pol. (cited in note 26); Hal-
brook, 26 Valp. U. L. Rev. (cited in note 25); Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke 
From the Right to Bear Arms and the Second Amendment, 29 Akron L. Rev. 57 (1995); 
David B. Kopel and Christopher C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: 
Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition, 56 Md. L. Rev. 438 (1997); Williams, 101 
Yale L.J. (cited in note 20); David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second 
Amendment Revolution: Conjuring With the People, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 879 (1996); David 
E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 Valp. U. L. Rev. 1007 (1994). 
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leveller democracy.55 Moderate democrats of the middling sort, 
such as Federal Farmer, were more apt to fear the dangers of an 
armed mob than they were to trust that such a mob might serve 
as the ultimate check on government tyranny. Federal Farmer 
and Pennsylvania's Old Whig each placed their faith in the state 
militias, not mobs, as the appropriate check on despotism, and 
were thus willing to limit gun ownership. 
The fact that so many Anti-Federalists believed that one 
could exclude large numbers of individuals from the right of gun 
ownership suggests that a significant portion of Americans in 
eighteenth-century America understood liberty in terms rather 
different than those of modern liberal rights-based constitutional 
theories. Indeed, it is important to recall that the right of gun 
ownership was connected with an obligation of militia service. 
Governments could not only compel attendance at militia mus-
ters, but the failure to comply could result in fines. In general, 
modern rights are not subject to these sorts of restrictions and 
seldom carry with them these types of obligations.56 
NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: THE RIGHT 
TO BEAR ARMS AS A CHECK ON TYRANNY 
For Standard Modelers, the checking function of the Second 
Amendment was intended by the framers to incorgorate a right 
of revolution into the fabric of constitutionalism. In his pro-
vocative article, "The Embarrassing Second Amendment," 
Sanford Levinson argues that the entire body of the people in 
arms, "or at least all of those treated as full citizens of the com-
munity," provided the ultimate constitutional check on govern-
ment tyranny.58 To the extent that Americans of the Revolu-
55. For Federal Farmer's attack on the levelling democracy, see Federal Farmer, 
Letters at 224,227,253 (cited in note 53). 
56. On modem theories of rights, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Duckworth & Co., 1977). For a discussion of the historical evolution of American views 
of rights, see Michael J. Lacey and Knud Haakonessen, eds., A Culture of Riglus: The Bill 
of Rights, in Philosophy, Politics and Law, 1791-1991 (Cambridge U. Press, 1991). For a 
critique of modem rights based constitutional and political thought, see Mary Ann Glen-
don, Riglus Talk: The 1mpoverishmem of Political Discourse (Macmillan, 1991). 
57. Reynolds, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. at 472 (cited in note 3). 
58. Levinson, 99 Yale L.J. at 646 (cited in note 2). The issue of citizenship in the 
post-Revolutionary era was exceedingly complex. Given the problem posed by loyalism, 
the issue of who might claim the full rights of citizenship is not as simple as Levinson's 
caveat implies. As historian James Kettner notes, the idea~ommon in English law-that 
"citizenship could comprehend separate legal categories of membership" continued to 
shape constitutional thought in this period. James Kettner, The Development of Ameri-
can Citizenship, 1608-1870 at 215-16 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1978). For a more 
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tionary era were Lockeans, such a claim is a truism. Most 
Americans did accept a right of revolution. Such a right, how-
ever, was not a constitutional check, but a natural right that one 
could not exercise under a functional constitutional government. 
The people had a right to abolish their government and resort to 
armed resistance in defense of their liberties when the constitu-
tional structures of government ceased to function. Even if 
some Anti-Federalists accepted the notion that certain natural 
rights might be judicially enforceable, few mainstream Anti-
Federalists would have accepted that revolution was such a 
. h 59 ng t. 
In fact, we can test this hypothesis by examining what hap-
pened when the most radical voices within Anti-Federalism tried 
to claim a right to use the militia and arms to check despotism. 
The two instances in which radical Anti-Federalists asserted a 
right to check government tyranny by resorting to arms, the 
Carlisle Riot and the Whiskey Rebellion, are central to evaluat-
ing the historical accuracy of the Standard Model/J(1 and the fail-
ure to analyze this body of evidence is among the most glaring 
historical omissions associated with the Standard Model.61 
Unrest in Carlisle was sparked by the Carlisle Federalists' 
decision to publicly celebrate their ratification victory. Carlisle 
elaborate treatment of the exclusionary nature of citizenship during this period, see 
Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Values of Citizenship in U.S. History (Yale U. 
Press, 1997). 
59. Modem scholars are divided over the role of natural rights in early American 
constitutional thought. For a defense of the idea of an unwritten constitution grounded 
in natural law, see Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwrinen Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1127 (1987). For alternative views that challenge the notion that the Founders ex-
pected judges to enforce principles of natural law drawn from an unwritten constitution, 
see Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: 
Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwrinen" Individual Rights?, 
69 N.C. L. Rev. 421 (1991), and Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1215 (1990). 
60. Actions such as the Carlisle Riot and the Whiskey Rebellion are also precisely 
the type of events that provide an opportunity to write a constitutional history from the 
bottom up. On the notion of writing constitutional history from the bottom up, see Hen-
drik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us AI~" 74 J. 
of Am. Hist. 1013 (1987), and William E. Forbath, Hendrick Hartog, and Martha Minow, 
Introduction: Legal Histories from Below, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 759. 
61. Episodes such as the Carlisle Riot and the Whiskey Rebellion, are not part of 
the current canon of constitutional law. On the concept of a constitutional canon, see 
Balkin and Levinson, 111 Harv. L. Rev. (cited in note 34), and Saul Cornell, 12 L. & Hist. 
Rev. (cited in note 19). Williams, 101 Yale L.J. at 582 (cited in note 20), and 81 Cornell 
L. Rev. (cited in note 54), deals briefly with the Whiskey Rebellion. Williams cites no 
contemporary evidence to substantiate his claim that opposition to the Whiskey Rebels 
was framed in the language of civic republicanism. For an analysis of contemporary re-
sponses to the Whiskey Rebellion, see notes 73-88 and accompanying text. 
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Anti-Federalists embraced a radical ideology that set them apart 
from the more moderate democratic ideas expressed in docu-
ments such as the Dissent of the Minority or the essays of An 
Old Whig. For these plebeian populists, the most radical voice 
among Anti-Federalists, the rights of the Federalist minority in 
Carlisle were easily cast aside when they contradicted the will of 
the local community. Plebeian populists were simple majoritari-
ans who embraced an extreme form of local democracy. When 
Anti-Federalists challenged Federalists revelers in the streets of 
Carlisle a riot ensued. The Anti-Federalist instigators of the riot 
were arrested and jailed. When the rioters refused the opportu-
nity for bail, local Anti-Federalists organized themselves through 
the militia, marched on the jail, and freed the prisoners. For 
plebeian populists the release of the prisoners was an example of 
direct democracy in action. Events in Carlisle vindicated their 
radical conception of constitutionalism and strengthened their 
resolve to oppose the new government. In contrast to the more 
sober voices of Anti-Federalist authors such as An Old Whig or 
Federal Farmer, the Carlisle Rioters did not fear the mob. For 
these Anti-Federalists the actions of the crowd were an authen-
tic expression of the will of the people.62 
William Petrikin, a rioter who became a spokesman for ple-
beian populist ideas, attacked Federalists, accusiiJP them of try-
ing to disarm "farmers, mechanics, labourers." Federalists, 
Petrikin claimed, thought "[i]t would be dangerous to trust such 
a rabble as this with arms in their hands."64 Petrikin's assault on 
the Federalists' notion of the militia reveals an important aspect 
of plebeian thinking about this issue. For plebeian populists 
such as the Carlisle rioters, the militia was a local institution that 
included the full body of citizens. These Anti-Federalists re-
jected the notion that one had to be a property owner to vote, 
serve on juries, or participate in the militia. During the Carlisle 
62. On the Carlisle Riot and the ideology of plebeian populism, see Saul Cornell, 
Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism, 76 J. of Am. Hist. 
1148 (1990). The Standard Modelers generalize populism to all Anti-Federalists. For 
example, in an influential essay, Amar, 100 Yale L.J. (cited in note 4), argues that Anti-
Federalism was essentially populist and democratic in spirit. This account not only ho-
mogenizes Anti-Federalist thought but seriously distorts the character of Anti-Federalist 
populism. In particular, Amar does not address the rather different approaches of mod-
erate democrats and plebeian populists to the problem of rights. 
63. Aristocrotis, The Government of Nature Delineated, in Storing, 3 Complete 
Anti-Federalist at 203 (cited in note 37). Storing did not identify the author in his collec-
tion. The attribution is based on a letter from William Petrikin to John Nicholson Car-
lisle (Feb. 24, 1788), in 2 DHRC at 694 (cited in note 27). 
64. Aristocrotis, Nature Delineated at 203 (cited in note 63). 
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Riot, plebeian populists chose to bypass both the state courts 
and the state militia. In contrast to the authors of the Dissent 
and An Old Whig, plebeian populists were not advocates of 
states' rights but supporters of a radicallocalist vision of democ-
racy. Yet even when plebeians invoked a right to bear arms to 
check despotism, it was not a constitutional right they asserted, 
but rather a vaguely articulated natural right of revolution. 
Their resistance was not couched in terms reminiscent of the 
language of either the Pennsylvania state constitution or the 
"Dissent of the Minority." 
The notion that the militia was literally the entire body of 
the people in arms, and the related idea that the people might 
spontaneously organize to resist tyranny, inspired back-country 
Anti-Federalists in Pennsylvania to constitute themselves as mi-
litia units outside of the control of the state. As one anonymous 
author noted, "the counties of Cumberland, Dauphine, and 
Franklin, appear to take the lead, and have been long since re-
pairing and cleaning their arms, and every young fellow who is 
able to do it, is providing himself with a rifle or musket, and 
ammunition. "65 This author went on to echo a common plebeian 
Anti-Federalist criticism of the Constitution, charging that "the 
lawyers, &c. when they precipitated with such fraud and decep-
tion the new system of government upon us, it seems to me, did 
not recollect, that the militia had arms."66 Anarchy was not 
something to be dreaded if the alternative was despotism. "A 
civil war is dreadful, but a little blood spilt now, will perhaps 
prevent much more hereafter."67 The author then went on to 
note that local militias refused to follow the directions of the 
state to deliver up their arms. 
For local Federalists, the events in Carlisle merely con-
firmed their suspicion that the opponents of the Constitution 
were bent on establishing mobocracy. This view was shared by 
members of the Anti-Federalist elite, who were also horrified by 
the events in back-country Pennsylvania. For elite Anti-
Federalists the right to bear arms and the militia were not a 
mandate for direct democracy. Bypassing the existing structures 
provided by the states and resorting to extra-legal crowd actions 
rendered the actions of plebeian populists contemptible in the 
65. Letter from Franklin County, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (April 30, 
1788), in 17 DHRC at 251-52 (cited in note 27). 
66. ld. at 252. 
67. ld. 
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eyes of elites. Extra-legal actions, such as those taken by Anti-
Federalists in Carlisle, were little more than mobocracy. For the 
eminent Massachusetts Anti-Federalist Elbridge Gerry, the Car-
lisle riot was a bitter reminder of the levelling tendencies to be 
found among the populace. Although an outspoken opponent of 
the Constitution, Gerry shared the Federalist belief that the na-
tion's golitical problems stemmed from an "excess of democ-
racy." When he learned that the "people threatened the Jus-
tice in Carlisle to pull down his House, and the houses of the 
federalists," Gerry expressed grave concern that "we shall be in a 
civil War," adding his hope that "[may] God ... 'avert the 
evil! "'69 Rather than solidifying opposition to the Constitution, 
the plebeian radicalism of the Carlisle rioters set them in opposi-
tion to mainstream Anti-Federalists.70 
A similar aversion to plebeian radicalism shaped the re-
sponse of Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist Charles Pettit, who 
sought to distance himself from events like the Carlisle riot, and 
to avert any actions that might possibly promote anarchy. To 
"reject the New Plan and attempt again to resort to the old," 
would, he argued "throw us into a State of Nature, filled with in-
ternal Discord."71 Pettit confided to George Washington that 
" [ e ]ven after the vote of adoption by the State Convention, a 
large proportion of the people, especially in the western coun-
ties, shewed a disposition to resist the operation of it, in a man-
ner which I thought indicated danger to the peace of the State." 
72 For Petitt, the willingness of plebeian populists to take their 
grievances into the streets was an example of mobocracy and 
had to be prevented at all costs. 
68. Gerry's statements about the dangers of an excess of democracy and the level-
ling spirit may be found in James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 
1787 at 39 (Ohio U. Press, 1984). Gerry's constitutional thought is discussed at length by 
George A. Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and Republican Statesmen (McGraw-
Hill, 1976). Gerry provides an excellent counter example to Akhil Amar's claim that 
Anti-Federalists were populist democrats, Amar, 100 Yale L.J. (cited in note 4). Elite 
Anti-Federalists such as Gerry were a vital part of the coalition that opposed the Consti-
tution. For more on elite Anti-Federalist thought, see Cornell, The Other Founders 51-80 
(cited in note 35). 
69. Cornell, 76 J. of Am. Hist. at 1169 (cited in note 62) (quoting Elridge Gerry in 
Madison, Notes of the Debates of the Federal Convention at 39 (cited in note 68)). 
70. For a description of the mood in Carlisle, see "Extract of a letter from Carlisle" 
dated January 4, 1788, in Independent Gazetteer (Jan. 12, 1788) DHRC Mfm:Pa. 328. 
71. Charles Pettit to Robert Whitehill (June 5, 1788), in 18 DHRC at 154 (cited in 
note 27). 
72. Charles Pettit to George Washington (March 19,1791), in DHRC Mfm:Pa. 706. 
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The Whiskey Rebellion provides another occasion to test 
the Standard Model's claims about the meaning of the Second 
Amendment. Supporters of the Standard Model have not de-
voted much attention to the Rebellion. This omission is unfor-
tunate for a number of reasons. The Whiskey Rebellion pro-
vides additional evidence that leading Anti-Federalists did not 
believe that individuals could spontaneously constitute them-
selves as militia units outside the control of the state or assert an 
individual right to bear arms to check government tyranny. 
Once again, the radical Anti-Federalists who did assert such a 
right did not ground it in any constitutional text, but instead 
framed their actions in terms of a natural, not a constitutional, 
right of revolution. The Rebellion is particularly fascinating be-
cause it prompted responses from a number of individuals who 
had taken a leading role in the debate over the Constitution, in-
cluding several Anti-Federalists who had signed the Dissent of 
the Minority. The Rebellion also drew support from plebeian 
populists, including individuals who had participated in the Car-
lisle riot.73 
The Whiskey Rebellion was a series of disturbances in 
western Pennsylvania and Kentucky prompted by a Federalist 
tax on whiskey, which included violent acts of resistance. Sup-
port for the rebels was strong in the town of Carlisle. William 
Petrikin, a leader of the Carlisle riot and a champion of plebeian 
populist ideals, sought support for the rebels from such promi-
nent former Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists as William Findley 
and Robert Whitehill, both of whom had signed the Dissent of 
the Minority.74 
While Findley sympathized with the grievances of the Re-
bels, he resolutely denounced their resort to arms and the un-
derlying constitutional misconceptions they used to justify their 
actions. Findley actually tried to dissuade Petrikin from sup-
porting the rebels. The fallacy of the Whiskey Rebels, Findley 
explained, was that they did not understand that resistance to 
unjust laws could not bypass the existing structures of constitu-
tional government. Findley blamed the rebellion on a popular 
misconception about the nature of constitutional government. 
"The great error among the people was an opinion, that an im-
73. The best account of the Rebellion is Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebel-
lion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (Oxford U. Press, 1986). 
74. For a discussion of the connection between the Carlisle riot and the Whiskey 
Rebellion, see Cornell, The Other Founders 200-13 (cited in note 35). 
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moral law might be opposed and yet the government re-
spected.''75 Findley himself repudiated plebeian populist consti-
tutionalism. For plebeian populists, the will of the people could 
be reconstituted spontaneously in local organizations such as the 
militia, the jury, or even the crowd. Findley and other main-
stream Anti-Federalists rejected this notion. "All men of discre-
tion" realized "that if they permitted government to be violently 
opposed, even in the execution of an obnoxious law, the same 
spirit would naturally lead to the destruction of all security and 
order; they saw by experience that in a state of anarchy the name 
of liberty would be [profaned] to sanction the most despotic tyr-
anny."76 
Findley's opposition to the excise tax thus did not include 
support for "riots or any thing that might tend to promote any 
unconstitutional exertions. ,n Findley strenuously argued that 
only legal action was appropriate to protest the excise law, and 
he denied that the situation faced by citizens in western Pennsyl-
vania resembled that of the colonists who had opposed British 
tyranny a generation earlier. Americans enjoyed representation 
under the new government and were therefore bound to obey 
the law. Findley took great pains to distinguish between the or-
derly use of extra-legal action during the Revolution-when the 
people had no legal recourse to challenge the unjust acts of Par-
liament-and recent actions in western Pennsylvania.78 
For the plebeian populists, the situation under the federal 
Constitution appeared to be quite similar to that faced by the 
colonists. For radicallocalists a distant government could never 
represent their interests. The use of extra-legal action during the 
Rebellion was therefore perfectly consistent with a plebeian con-
stitutionalism. Erecting liberty poles, tarring and feathering ex-
cise men, and the use of threatening pseudonymous notes were 
all actions drawn from the rich stock of ritual behavior central to 
plebeian political culture in the Anglo-American world. Petrikin 
had employed many of these same techniques during the strug-
gle against the Constitution. From Petrikin's point of view, the 
excise was merely the most recent example of how the well-born 
had created an oppressive government to do their bidding. 
75. William Findley, History of the Insurrection in the Four Western Counties of 
Pennsylvania 300 (Samuel Harrison Smith, 1796). 
76. ld. at 177. 
77. ld. at 285. 
78. Id. 
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Petrikin and Findley clearly interpreted the legacy of the Revo-
lution in different ways.79 
For Petrikin, erecting liberty poles was not the end of pro-
test, but merely the beginning. He sought to dissuade the local 
militia from joining federal forces marching against the Rebels. 
Petrikin's vision of the militia as an agent of a radical democracy 
grew out of the same localist agenda that had inspired him to 
oppose the Constitution. He hoped that the militia might serve 
the same function it had during the Carlisle Riot, acting as an 
agent of local popular democratic agitation and organization. 
This time, however, Petrikin was disappointed. The militia did 
not oppose Washington's troops.80 
At a meeting in Carlisle in which Petrikin and the former 
Anti-Federalist leader, Robert Whitehill, participated, Petrikin 
urged local residents to side with the rebels against the govern-
ment. As one participant noted, Petrikin "sd a great deal agst 
the excise law & against the Constitution."81 Petrikin was op-
posed by Whitehill, who had been one of the most prominent 
Anti-Federalists in the state. Whitehill "endeavored to show the 
impropriety of opposing" the law, arguing that "it would be bet-
ter to submit," since continued opposition could "bring on a 
revolution."82 In opposition to Whitehill, Petrikin argued that 
"the show of Liberty to the West ought not to be falted." Rather 
it should be "applauded and supported."83 In response to White-
hill's suggestion that continued resistance would start a revolu-
tion, Petrikin observed "all Revns began by force and that it was 
as well it should begin. "84 The actions of the government had 
convinced him that "it was time there should be a Revolution-
that Congress ought either to Repeal the Law or allow these 
people to set up a government for themselves-& be separated 
from us. "85 Robert Whitehill recalled in his testimony that 
Petrikin claimed that the "People in the West had better Sepa-
rate themselves from the Government of the U. St. than undergo 
such hardships as they were subjected to, & they had better form 
79. On plebeian political culture and the rituals of protest, see Alfred F. Young, 
English Plebeian Culture and Eighteenth·Century American Radicalism, in Margaret C. 
Jacob and James R. Jacob, eds., The Origins of Anglo-American Radicalism 185 (Hu-
manities Press International, 1984). 
80. Cornell, The Other Founders 200-12 (cited in note 35). 
81. Id. at 208-09. 
82. ld. 
83. ld. 
84. ld. 
85. Id. 
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of Govermt for themselves-that they should have a govermt 
who had no President no King."86 Petrikin's radicalism em-
braced not only the rituals of plebeian culture, but an extreme 
form of democratic localism. He continued to affirm the legiti-
macy of plebeian rituals of protest and extra-legal action. The 
right of revolution, Petrikin argued, had not been cast aside with 
the establishment of the Constitution. In contrast to Findley and 
Whitehill, Petrikin believed that westerners were in exactly the 
same relationship to the new government as Americans had 
been with Britain. 
For plebeian radicals the federal government under the 
Federalist party was just as illegitimate as the government of 
George III. Indeed, in the view of one contemporary, the Whis-
key Rebels "flattered themselves that they were only carrying 
out Whig principles and following Whig examples in resisting the 
excise law." 87 Petrikin's politics typified the views of an impor-
tant radical fringe within the ranks of the Anti-Federalist move-
ment. Plebeian radicals articulated the most radical vision of 
democracy present in the debate over the Constitution; this ide-
ology was rejected by more mainstream Anti-Federalists. The 
Whiskey Rebellion demonstrates the irreconcilable tension be-
tween moderate democrats such as Findley and plebeian radicals 
such as Petrikin. This split reflected different constitutional 
philosophies and approaches to politics. 
Rather than view the right to bear arms as an expression of 
a right of resistance, it would be far more accurate to see the 
language of both the Pennsylvania state constitution and the 
federal Constitution as part of an effort to provide the state with 
a means to crush such resistance. The examples of Shays's Re-
bellion and the Whiskey Rebellion both demonstrate that the 
militia was far more likely to be used to support the state than to 
provide a means to challenge the authority of the state.88 
HISTORY AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
AN OPEN QUESTION 
The presence of such profound differences within the ranks 
of Anti-Federalists (even within a single state) raises serious 
86. ld. at 119 (testimony of Robert Whitehill). 
87. Thomas P. Slaughter, The Friends of Libeny, the Friends of Order, in Stephen 
Boyd, ed., !he Whiskey Rebellion: Past and Present Perspectives 13 (Greenwood Press, 
1985) (quotmg Reverend James Carnahan). 
88. On this point, see Bellesiles, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. (cited in note 5). 
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questions about the assumption of the Standard Model that 
there was a broad consensus in post-Revolutionary American on 
how the right to bear arms ought to be interpreted. Efforts to 
discern a monolithic original intent on this issue seem histori-
cally naive.89 The case of Pennsylvania suggests that Americans 
may have been as deeply divided then as they are now over this 
question. The idea that radical localists such as the Anti-
Federalist Carlisle rioters might have meant the same thing as 
the ultra-nationalist Joseph Story when they spoke about the 
right to bear arms seems high unlikely. 90 Even if the case of 
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalism proves to be exceptional, the 
claim that a single paradigm can explain all of American consti-
tutional thought on an issue as complicated as the right to bear 
arms runs counter to dominant trends in recent historical schol-
arship on the character of early American constitutional and po-
litical thought.91 It would be nothing short of astonishing if there 
were no significant regional or class variations on an issue as 
complex as the right to bear arms.92 Without further historical 
research and analysis, the truth of the Standard Model appears 
to be anything but a commonplace. 
89. Historians are far more dubious about identifying a single intent from among 
the many different positions voiced by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution. To 
claim that commentators writing more than generation later meant the same thing seems 
even more doubtful. For a discussion of the difficulty of weighting the various perspec· 
tives articulated during ratification, see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and 
Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (A.A. Knopf, 1996). 
90. Sanford Levinson links Federal Farmer, James Madison, and Joseph Story, to-
gether into a single common stance on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Levin-
son, 99 Yale L.J. at 649 (cited in note 2). The example of Pennsylvania suggests that 
there was no consensus on this issue. The example of Massachusetts provides additional 
evidence of profound disagreement over how to interpret the right to bear arms. See 
Hardy, 4 J.L. and Pol. at 40-42 (cited in note 26). 
91. A good sense of the divisions among early American historians may be found in 
comments collected in The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium 
of Views and Reviews, 44 Wm. & Mary 0. 550 (1987). 
92. For two rather different efforts to explore the relationship between regionalism 
and the emergence of different political cultures in early America, see Jack P. Greene, 
Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the 
Formation of American Culture (U. of North Carolina Press, 1988), and David Hackett 
Fischer, Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford U. Press, 1989). On 
the relationship of class to the problem of rights consciousness, see Hartog, 74 J. of Am. 
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